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Abstract. We give a detailed account of the use of Q-curve reductions
to construct elliptic curves over Fp2 with efficiently computable endo-
morphisms, which can be used to accelerate elliptic curve-based cryp-
tosystems in the same way as Gallant–Lambert–Vanstone (GLV) and
Galbraith–Lin–Scott (GLS) endomorphisms. Like GLS (which is a de-
generate case of our construction), we offer the advantage over GLV of
selecting from a much wider range of curves, and thus finding secure
group orders when p is fixed for efficient implementation. Unlike GLS,
we also offer the possibility of constructing twist-secure curves. We con-
struct several one-parameter families of elliptic curves over Fp2 equipped
with efficient endomorphisms for every p > 3, and exhibit examples of
twist-secure curves over Fp2 for the efficient Mersenne prime p = 2
127−1.
Keywords: Elliptic curve cryptography; endomorphism; exponentiation; GLS;
GLV; Q-curves; scalar decomposition; scalar multiplication
This is an extended treatment of the curves and techniques introduced in [44],
including two more families of curves, more efficient scalar decompositions, and
more detail on exceptional CM curves and 4-dimensional decompositions.
1 Introduction
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field Fq, and let G ⊆ E(Fq) be a cyclic
subgroup of prime order N . When implementing cryptographic protocols in G,
the fundamental operation is scalar multiplication (or exponentiation):
Given P in G and m in Z, compute [m]P := P ⊕ · · · ⊕ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
.
The literature on general scalar multiplication algorithms is vast, and we
will not explore it in detail here (see [15, §2.8,§11.2] and [8, Chapter 9] for
introductions to exponentiation and multiexponentiation algorithms). For our
purposes, it suffices to note that the dominant factor in scalar multiplication
time using conventional algorithms is the bitlength ⌈log2 |m|⌉ of m. As a basic
example, we may compute [m]P using a variant of the classic binary method,
which requires at most ⌈log2 |m|⌉ doublings and (in the worst case) about as
many addings in G (in general, log2 |m| ∼ log2N ∼ log2 q).
Suppose E is equipped with an efficient Fq-endomorphism ψ. By efficient, we
mean that we can compute the image ψ(P ) of any point P in E(Fq) for the cost
of O(1) operations in Fq. In practice, we want this to cost no more than a few
doublings in E(Fq).
Assume ψ(G) ⊆ G, or equivalently, that ψ restricts to an endomorphism of G.1
Now G is a finite cyclic group, isomorphic to Z/NZ, and every endomorphism
of Z/NZ is just an integer multiplication modulo N . Hence, ψ acts on G as
multiplication by some integer eigenvalue λψ : that is,
ψ|G = [λψ ]G for some −N/2 < λψ ≤ N/2 .
The eigenvalue λψ is a root of the characteristic polynomial of ψ in Z/NZ.
Returning to the problem of scalar multiplication: we want to compute [m]P .
Rewriting m as
m = a+ bλψ (mod N)
for some a and b, we can compute [m]P using the relation
[m]P = [a]P ⊕ [bλψ]P = [a]P ⊕ [b]ψ(P )
and a 2-dimensional multiexponentation such as Straus’s algorithm [47], which
has a loop length of log2 ‖(a, b)‖∞: that is, log2 ‖(a, b)‖∞ doubles and at most
as many adds2 (recall ‖(a, b)‖∞ = max(|a|, |b|)). If |λψ| is not too small, then
we can easily find (a, b) such that log2 ‖(a, b)‖∞ is roughly 12 log2N (we remove
the “If” and the “roughly” for our ψ in §4.)
The endomorphism therefore lets us replace conventional log2N -bit scalar
multiplications with (12 log2N)-bit multiexponentiations. In basic binary meth-
ods this means halving the loop length, cutting the number of doublings in half.
Of course, in practice we are not halving the execution time. The precise
speedup depends on a variety of factors, including the choice of exponentiation
and multiexponentiation algorithms, the cost of computing ψ, and the cost of
doublings and addings in terms of bit operations—to say nothing of the cryp-
tographic protocol, which may prohibit some other conventional speedups. For
example: in [16], Galbraith, Lin, and Scott report experiments where crypto-
graphic operations on GLS curves required between 70% and 83% of the time
1 The assumption is satisfied, almost by default, in the context of classical discrete
log-based cryptosystems. If ψ(G) 6⊆ G, then E [N ](Fq) = G+ψ(G) ∼= (Z/NZ)2, so N2 |
#E(Fq) and N | q−1; such E are cryptographically inefficient, and discrete logs in G
are vulnerable to the Menezes–Okamoto–Vanstone and Frey–Ru¨ck reductions [33,14].
However, the assumption should be verified carefully in the context of pairing-based
cryptography, where G and ψ with ψ(G) 6⊆ G arise naturally.
2 Straus’s algorithm serves as a simple and convenient reference example here:
like all multiexponentiation algorithms, its running time depends essentially on
log
2
‖(a, b)‖∞. It is not the fastest multiexponentiation, nor is it uniform or constant-
time; as such, it is not recommended for real-world implementations.
required for the previous best practice curves—with the variation depending on
the architecture, the underlying curve arithmetic, and the protocol in question.
To put this technique into practice, we need a source of cryptographic elliptic
curves equipped with efficient endomorphisms. In the large characteristic case3,
there are two archetypal constructions:
1. The classic Gallant–Lambert–Vanstone (GLV) construction [17] uses elliptic
curves with explicit complex multiplication (CM) by quadratic orders with
tiny discriminants. These curves can be found by reducing CM curves over
number fields modulo suitable primes.
2. The more recent Galbraith–Lin–Scott (GLS) construction [16]. Here, curves
over Fp are viewed over Fp2 ; the p-power sub-Frobenius induces an extremely
efficient endomorphism on the quadratic twist (which can have prime order).
GLV and GLS have been combined to give higher-dimensional variants for elliptic
curves ([29], [50]), and extended to hyperelliptic curves ([4], [27], [41], [48]).
New endomorphisms from Q-curves. This work develops a new source of elliptic
curves over Fp2 with efficient endomorphisms: reductions of quadratic Q-curves.
Definition 1. A quadratic Q-curve of degree d is an elliptic curve E without
CM, defined over a quadratic number field K, such that there exists an isogeny
of degree d from E to its Galois conjugate σE (formed by applying σ to the
coefficients of the defining equation of E), where 〈σ〉 = Gal(K/Q).
Q-curves are well-established objects of interest in number theory, where they
have formed a natural setting for generalizations of the Modularity Theorem. We
recommend Ellenberg [12] for an excellent introduction to the theory.
Our application of quadratic Q-curves is somewhat more prosaic: given a
d-isogeny E˜ → σE˜ over a quadratic field, we reduce modulo an inert prime p
to obtain an isogeny E → σE over Fp2 . We then exploit the fact that the p-
power Frobenius isogeny maps σE back onto E ; composing with the reduced
d-isogeny, we obtain an endomorphism of E of degree dp. For efficiency, d must
be small; happily, for small values of d, Hasegawa has written down universal
one-parameter families of Q-curves [20]. We thus obtain one-parameter families
of elliptic curves over Fp2 equipped with efficient non-integer endomorphisms.
4
For concrete examples, we consider d = 2, 3, 5, and 7 in §5, §6, §7, and §8,
respectively. We define our curves in short Weierstrass form for maximum gen-
erality and flexibility, but we also give isomorphisms to Montgomery, twisted
Edwards, and Doche–Icart–Kohel models where appropriate.
3 We are primarily interested in the large characteristic case, where q = p or p2, so
we do not discuss τ -adic or Frobenius expansion-style techniques (see [42], [28, §5]).
4 While our curves are defined over an extension field, the extension degree is only
2, so Weil descent attacks offer no advantage when solving DLP instances (cf. [16,
§9]).
Comparison with GLV. Like GLV, our method involves reducing curves defined
over number fields to obtain curves over finite fields with explicit CM. However,
we emphasise a profound difference: in our method, the curves over number fields
generally do not have CM themselves.
GLV curves are necessarily isolated examples—and the really useful examples
are extremely limited in number (cf. [29, App. A]). The scarcity of GLV curves is
their Achilles’ heel: as noted in [16], if p is fixed then there is no guarantee that
there will exist a GLV curve with prime (or almost-prime) order over Fp. While
we discuss this phenomenon further in §9, it is instructive to consider the example
discussed in [16, §1]: the most efficient GLV curves have CM discriminants −3
and −4. If we are working at the 128-bit security level, then taking p = 2255−19
allows particularly fast arithmetic in Fp. But the largest prime factor of the order
of a curve over Fp with CM discriminant −4 (resp. −3) has 239 (resp. 230) bits:
using these curves wastes 9 (resp. 13) potential bits of security. In fact, we are
lucky with −3 and −4: for all of the other discriminants offering endomorphisms
of degree at most 3, we can do no better than a 95-bit prime factor, which
represents a catastrophic 80-bit loss of relative security.
In contrast, our construction yields true families of curves, covering ∼ p iso-
morphism classes over Fp2 for any choice of p. This gives us a vastly higher
probability of finding secure curves over practically important fields.
Comparison with GLS. Like GLS, we construct curves over Fp2 equipped with
an inseparable endomorphism. And like GLS, each of our families offer around p
distinct isomorphism classes of curves, making it easy to find secure group orders
when p is fixed.
But unlike GLS, our curves have j-invariants in Fp2 and not Fp: they are not
isomorphic to, or twists of, subfield curves. This allows us to find twist-secure
curves: that is, curves with secure orders whose twists also have secure orders.
Twist-security is crucial in many elliptic curve-based protocols (including
[23], [24], [5], [31], and [7]); it is particularly important in modern x-coordinate-
only ECDH implementations, such as Bernstein’s Curve25519 software [2] (which
anticipates the kind of fault attack detailed in [13]). GLS curves cannot be used
in any of these constructions.
As we will see in §3, our construction degenerates to GLS when d = 1. Our
construction is therefore a sort of generalized GLS—though it is not the higher-
degree generalization anticipated by Galbraith, Lin, and Scott themselves, which
composes a p-power sub-Frobenius endomorphism with a non-rational separable
isogeny and its dual isogeny (cf. [16, Theorem 1]).
Acknowledgements. The author thanks Craig Costello, Hu¨seyin Hıs¸ıl, Franc¸ois
Morain, and Charlotte Scribot for their help and advice throughout this project.
2 Notation and Elementary Constructions
Throughout, we work over fields of characteristic not 2 or 3. Let
E : y2 = x3 +Ax+B
be an elliptic curve over such a field K. (Recall that for an equation in this form
to define an elliptic curve, the discriminant −16(4A3+27B2) must be nonzero.)
Galois conjugates. For every automorphism σ of K, we have a conjugate curve
σE : y2 = x3 + (σA)x+ (σB) .
If φ : E1 → E2 is an isogeny, then we obtain a conjugate isogeny σφ : σE1 → σE2
by applying σ to the defining equations of φ, E1, and E2. We write (p) for the
p-th powering automorphism of Fp. We note that (p) is trivial to compute on
Fp2 = Fp(
√
∆), since (p)(a+ b
√
∆) = a− b√∆ for all a and b in Fp.
Quadratic twists and twisted endomorphisms. For every nonzero λ in K, the
quadratic twist of E by λ is the curve over K(λ2) defined by
Eλ : y2 = x3 + λ4Ax+ λ6B .
The twisting isomorphism δ(λ) : E → Eλ is defined over K(λ) by
δ(λ) : (x, y) 7−→ (λ2x, λ3y) .
Observe that δ(λ1)δ(λ2) = δ(λ1λ2) for any λ1, λ2; and δ(−λ) = −δ(λ). For every
K-endomorphism ψ of E , there is a twisted K(λ2)-endomorphism
ψλ := δ(λ)ψδ(λ−1) in End(Eλ) .
It is important to distinguish conjugates (marked by left-superscripts) from
twists (marked by right-superscripts); note that σ(Eλ) = (σE)σλ for all λ and σ.
Quadratic twists over finite fields. If µ is a nonsquare in K = Fq, then E
√
µ is a
quadratic twist of E . But E√µ1 and E√µ2 are Fq-isomorphic for all nonsquares µ1
and µ2 in Fq (the isomorphism δ(
√
µ1/µ2) is defined over Fq because µ1/µ2 must
be a square); so, up to Fq-isomorphism, it makes sense to speak of the quadratic
twist. We let E ′ denote the quadratic twist when the choice of nonsquare is
not important. Similarly, if ψ is an Fq-endomorphism of E , then ψ′ denotes the
corresponding twisted Fq-endomorphism of E ′.
Traces and cardinalities. If K = Fq, then πE denotes the q-power Frobenius
endomorphism of E . The characteristic polynomial of πE has the form
χE(T ) = T 2 − tET + q;
the trace tE satisfies the Hasse bound |tE | ≤ 2√q. Recall #E(Fq) = q + 1 − tE
and tE′ = −tE , so
#E(Fq) + #E ′(Fq) = 2(q + 1) . (1)
Explicit isogenies. Let S ⊂ E be a finite subgroup defined overK; Ve´lu’s formulæ
([26, §2.4], [49]) compute the explicit (normalized) quotient isogeny
φ : E −→ E/S : y2 = x3 +ASx+BS ,
mapping (x, y) to (φx(x), yφ
′
x(x)) for some φx in K(x). We will need explicit
formulæ for the cases #S = 2, 3, 5, and 7. If S = {0, (α, 0)} has order 2, then
AS = −4A−15α2 , BS = B−7α(3α2+A) , and φx(x) = x+ 3α2+Ax−α . (2)
If S has odd order d = 2e+ 1, then it is defined by a kernel polynomial F (x) =∑e
i=0 fix
e−i (so F (x(P )) = 0 if and only if P is in S \ {0}); and then
AS = (1− 10e)A− 30(f1/f0)2 + 60f2/f0 , (3)
BS = (1− 28e)B + 28f1/f0 + 70(f1/f0)3 − 210f1f2/f20 + 210f3/f0 , (4)
and
φx(x) = (2e+ 1)x+ 2
f1
f0
− 4(x3 +Ax+B)(F ′(x)F (x) )′ − 2(3x2 +A)F ′(x)F (x) . (5)
Legendre symbols. The Legendre symbol
(
n
/
p
)
is defined to be 1 if n is a square
mod p, −1 if n is not a square mod p, and 0 if p divides n.
Reduced lattice bases. We work exclusively with the infinity norm ‖ · ‖∞ in this
article (recall ‖(a, b)‖∞ := max(|a|, |b|)). An ordered basis [e1, e2] of a lattice
in Z2 is reduced if
‖e1‖∞ ≤ ‖e2‖∞ ≤ ‖e1 − e2‖∞ ≤ ‖e1 + e2‖∞ ; (6)
a reduced basis has minimal length with respect to ‖ · ‖∞ (see [22]).
3 Quadratic Q-curves and their Reductions
Suppose E˜/Q(√∆) is a quadratic Q-curve of prime degree d (as in Definition 1),
where ∆ is a discriminant prime to d, and let φ˜ : E˜ → σE˜ be the corresponding
d-isogeny (where σ is the conjugation of Q(
√
∆) over Q). In general, φ˜ is only
defined over a quadratic extension Q(
√
∆, γ) of Q(
√
∆) (cf. [18, Prop. 3.1]), but
we can always reduce to the case where γ =
√±d (see [18, remark p. 385]).
Indeed, the Q-curves of degree d that we treat below all have γ =
√−d; so to
simplify matters, from now on we will
Assume φ˜ is defined over Q(
√
∆,
√−d).
Let p be a prime inert in Q(
√
∆) (equivalently, ∆ is not a square in Fp), of
good reduction for E˜ and prime to d. If O is the ring of integers of Q(√∆), then
Fp2 = O/(p) = Fp(
√
∆) .
Looking at the Galois groups of our fields, we have a series of injections
〈(p)〉 = Gal(Fp(
√
∆)/Fp) →֒ Gal(Q(
√
∆)/Q) →֒ Gal(Q(
√
∆,
√
−d)/Q) .
The image of (p) in Gal(Q(
√
∆)/Q) is σ, because p is inert in Q(
√
∆). We extend
σ to the automorphism of Q(
√
∆,
√−d) that is the image of (p): that is,
σ
(
α+ β
√
∆+ γ
√
−d+ δ
√
−d∆) = α− β√∆+ (−d/p) (γ√−d− δ√−d∆) (7)
for all α, β, γ, and δ ∈ Q.
Now let E/Fp2 be the reduction modulo p of E˜ . The curve σE˜ reduces to (p)E ,
while the d-isogeny φ˜ : E˜ → σE˜ reduces to a d-isogeny φ : E → (p)E over Fp2 .
Applying σ to φ˜, we obtain a second d-isogeny σφ˜ : σE˜ → E˜ travelling in the
opposite direction, which reduces mod p to a conjugate isogeny (p)φ : (p)E → E
defined over Fp2 . Composing
σφ˜ with φ˜ yields endomorphisms σφ˜ ◦ φ˜ of E˜ and
φ˜◦σφ˜ of σE˜ , each of degree d2. But (by definition) E˜ and σE˜ do not have CM, so
all of their endomorphisms are integer multiplications; and since the only integer
multiplications of degree d2 are [d] and [−d], we conclude that
σφ˜ ◦ φ˜ = [ǫpd]E˜ and φ˜ ◦ σφ˜ = [ǫpd]σ E˜ , where ǫp ∈ {±1} .
Technically, σφ˜ and (p)φ are—up to sign—the dual isogenies of φ˜ and φ, respec-
tively. The sign ǫp depends on p: if τ is the extension of σ to Q(
√
∆,
√−d) that
is not the image of (p), then τ φ˜ ◦ φ˜ = [−ǫpd]E˜ . Reducing modulo p, we see that
(p)φ ◦ φ = [ǫpd]E and φ ◦ (p)φ = [ǫpd](p)E .
The map (x, y) 7→ (xp, yp) defines p-isogenies
πp :
(p)E −→ E and (p)πp : E −→ (p)E .
Observe that (p)πp ◦ πp = πE and πp ◦ (p)πp = π(p)E . Composing πp with φ yields
a degree-pd endomorphism
ψ := πp ◦ φ ∈ End(E) .
We also obtain an Fp2 -endomorphism ψ
′ on the quadratic twist E ′.
If d is very small, then ψ and ψ′ are efficient because φ is defined by poly-
nomials of degree about d, and πp acts as a simple conjugation on coordinates
in Fp2 (as in Eq. (7)). In this article we concentrate on prime d ≤ 7.
Theorem 1. The endomorphisms ψ and ψ′ satisfy
ψ2 = [ǫpd]πE and (ψ′)2 = [−ǫpd]πE′ ,
respectively. There exists an integer r satisfying5
dr2 = 2p+ ǫptE (8)
5 We warn the reader that the integer r here corresponds to ǫpr in [44].
such that
[r]ψ = [p] + ǫpπE and [r]ψ′ = [p]− ǫpπE′ ; (9)
the characteristic polynomial of both ψ and ψ′ is
Pψ(T ) = Pψ′(T ) = T
2 − rdT + dp .
Proof. Clearly πp ◦ φ = (p)φ ◦ (p)πp, so
ψ2 = πpφπpφ = πpφ
(p)φ(p)πp = πp[ǫpd]
(p)πp = [ǫpd]πp
(p)πp = [ǫpd]πE .
Similarly, choosing a nonsquare µ in Fp2 , so E ′ = E
√
µ and ψ′ = ψ
√
µ, we find
(ψ′)2 = δ(µ
1
2 )ψ2δ(µ−
1
2 ) = δ(µ
1
2 (1−p2))[ǫpd]πE′ = δ(−1)[ǫpd]πE′ = [−ǫpd]πE′ .
The degree of ψ (and ψ′) is dp, so both have a characteristic polynomial in the
form Pψ(T ) = T
2 − aT + dp for some integer a. Hence,
[a]ψ = ψ2 + [dp] = [ǫpd]π + [dp] . (10)
Squaring both sides, replacing ψ2 with [ǫpd]π, and then factoring out [ǫpd]π, we
find a2 = 2dp + dǫptE . It follows that d | a2; but d is squarefree, so a = dr
for some integer r, whence Eq. (8) and the characteristic polynomial. Putting
a = dr in Eq. (10) yields [r]ψ = [p] + ǫpπ; a similar argument for ψ
′, using
ψ′2 = [−ǫpd]πE′ , yields [r]ψ′ = [p]− ǫpπ, completing Eq. (9). ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. The curves E and E ′ are ordinary if and only if r 6= 0; and then
|r| = [Z[ψ] : Z[πE ]] = [Z[ψ′] : Z[πE′ ]] .
Proof. The curves E and E ′ are ordinary (not supersingular) if and only if p ∤ tE ,
if and only if p ∤ r (using Eq. (8) and p ∤ d). But the Hasse bound gives |tE | ≤ 2p,
so |r| ≤ 2
√
p/d; the only r in this interval divisible by p is 0, proving the first
claim. If E is ordinary, then Z[πE ] and Z[ψ] are quadratic imaginary orders of
discriminant d2r2 − 4dp and tE2 − 4p2 = r2(d2r2 − 4dp), respectively, so |r| is
the conductor of Z[π′E ] in Z[ψ]. The same holds for ψ
′ and πE′ on E ′. ⊓⊔
Equation (8) relates r to the orders of E and E ′: we find
#E(Fp2) = (p+ ǫp)2 − ǫpdr2 and #E ′(Fp2) = (p− ǫp)2 + ǫpdr2 . (11)
If E is supersingular, so r = 0, then [51, Theorem 1.1] yields a stronger statement:
E(Fp2) ∼= (Z/(p+ ǫp)Z)2 and E ′(Fp2) ∼= (Z/(p− ǫp)Z)2.
Corollary 2. Suppose E is ordinary. If G ⊆ E(Fp2) (resp. G′ ⊆ E ′(Fp2)) is a
cyclic subgroup such that ψ(G) ⊆ G (resp. ψ′(G′) ⊆ G′), then the eigenvalue of
ψ on G (resp. ψ′ on G′) is
λψ ≡ p+ ǫp
r
(mod #G) and λψ′ ≡ p− ǫp
r
(mod #G′) .
Proof. Theorem 1 states that [r]ψ = [p]+ǫpπ in End(E), so ker([p]+ǫpπ) contains
E [r], and hence [p] + ǫpπ is divisible by r in End(E): indeed, the quotient is ψ.
The result follows on restricting to G; the argument for ψ′ and G′ is the same. ⊓⊔
Q-curves: Where from, and why? Now we just need a source of quadratic Q-
curves of small degree. Elkies [11] shows that all Q-curves correspond to rational
points on certain modular curves:6 Let X∗(d) be the quotient of the modular
curve X0(d) by all of its Atkin–Lehner involutions. If e is a point in X
∗(d)(Q)
and E is a preimage of e in X0(d)(Q(
√
∆)) \ X0(d)(Q) for some ∆, then E
parametrizes (up to Q-isomorphism) a d-isogeny φ˜ : E˜ → σE˜ over Q(
√
∆), where
σ is the involution of Q(
√
∆)/Q.
Luckily enough, for very small d, both X0(d) and X
∗(d) have genus zero—
so not only can we get plenty of rational points on X∗(d), we can get a whole
one-parameter family of Q-curves of degree d. Hasegawa gives explicit universal
curves for d = 2, 3, and 7 in [20, Theorem 2.2]: for each squarefree integer ∆ 6= 1,
every Q-curve of degree d = 2, 3, 7 over Q(
√
∆) is Q-isomorphic to a rational
specialization of one of these families.
Crucially, Hasegawa’s families for d = 2, 3, and 7 are defined for any square-
free ∆; so we are free to start by fixing p, before choosing a ∆ to suit. Indeed, the
particular choice of ∆ is theoretically irrelevant—since all quadratic extensions
of Fp are isomorphic—so we may choose any practically convenient value for ∆,
such as one permitting faster arithmetic in Fp2 = Fp(
√
∆).
Of course, one might ask why it is necessary to use this characteristic-zero
theory when we could simply search for curves over Fp2 with a d-isogeny to
their Galois conjugate. But for low degrees d where X0(d) has genus zero, every
such curve arises as the reduction mod p of a Q-curve over Q(
√
∆) where ∆
is a nonsquare mod p. Indeed, the curves over Fp2 with d-isogenies to their
Galois conjugates correspond (up to isomorphism) to points in X∗(d)(Fp) with
preimages in X0(d)(Fp2 ) \ X0(d)(Fp). But X0(d) is isomorphic to P1 over the
ground field in the cases we consider, so every such point lifts trivially to a point
in X∗(d)(Q) with preimages in X0(d)(Q(
√
∆))\X0(d)(Q): that is, to a Q-curve.
We therefore lose no candidate curves over Fp2 by reducing Q-curves mod p
instead of working directly over Fp2 . What we gain by working with Q-curves is
some simplicity7 and universality in our proofs, to say nothing of the wealth of
mathematical literature to be raided for examples and theorems. For example:
instead of deriving and proving defining equations for these families over Fp2 ,
we can just conveniently borrow Hasegawa’s universal Q-curve equations.
GLS as the degenerate case d = 1. Suppose φ˜ : E˜ → σE˜ is an isogeny of degree
d = 1: that is, an isomorphism. Then j(E˜) = j(σE˜) = σj(E˜), so j(E˜) is in
Q, and E˜ is Q(√∆)-isomorphic to a curve defined over Q. Suppose, then, that
6 The reader unfamiliar with modular curves can get away with the following here: the
modular curve X0(d) parametrizes isomorphism classes of (cyclic) d-isogenies. If d is
prime—which is the only case we need here—then there is a unique Atkin–Lehner
involution ω on X0(d): its action corresponds to exchanging isogenies φ with their
duals φ†. The quotient X0(d) → X∗(d) := X0(d)/〈ω〉 is a double cover, mapping
(the isomorphism class of) an isogeny φ to the pair (of isomorphism classes) {φ, φ†}.
7 Especially since Q-curves (by definition) have no non-integer endomorphisms, while
every elliptic curve over Fp2 has complex multiplication.
E˜ is defined over Q and base-extended to Q(√∆): then E˜ = σE˜ , and we can
apply our construction taking φ˜ : E˜ → σE˜ to be the identity map. Reducing
modulo an inert p, we have ψ = πp and ψ
2 = π2p = πE , so ψ has eigenvalue
±1 on cryptographic subgroups of E(Fp2): clearly, ψ is of no use to us for scalar
decompositions. However, the twisted endomorphism ψ′ on E ′ satisfies (ψ′)2 =
−πE′ , so the eigenvalue of ψ′ on cryptographic subgroups is a square root of −1,
which is large enough to yield good scalar decompositions. We have recovered
the GLS endomorphism (cf. [16, Theorem 2]).
While E ′(Fp2) may have prime order, E(Fp2) cannot: the fixed points of πp
form a subgroup of order p+1− t0, where t20− 2p = tE (and the complementary
subgroup has order p+1+ t0). Hence, the largest prime divisor of #E(Fp2 ) can
be no larger than O(p); the curve E ′ can therefore never be twist-secure.
4 Short Scalar Decompositions
Before moving on to concrete families and examples, we will show that the
endomorphisms developed in §3 yield short scalar decompositions.
Suppose G ∼= Z/NZ is a cyclic subgroup of E(Fp2) such that ψ(G) ⊆ G. Corol-
lary 2 shows that ψ acts as the eigenvalue λψ ≡ (p + ǫp)/r (mod N) (a square
root of ǫpd) on G. Given an integer m, we want to compute a decomposition
m = a+ bλψ (mod N)
so as to efficiently compute [m]P = [a]P⊕[b]ψ(P ) for P in G. The decomposition
is not unique: far from it. The set of all decompositions (a, b) of m is the lattice
coset (m, 0) + L, where
L := 〈(N, 0), (−λψ , 1)〉 ⊂ Z2
is the lattice of decompositions of 0: that is, of integer pairs (a, b) such that
a+ bλψ ≡ 0 (mod N).
We want to find a decomposition ofm where a and b have minimal bitlength:
that is, where ⌈log2 ‖(a, b)‖∞⌉ is as small as possible. The following algorithm8
computes an optimal decomposition of m given a reduced basis of L.
Algorithm 1 Given a reduced basis [b1,b2] for L, computes a decomposition of
minimal bitlength (and bitlength at most ⌈log2 ‖b2‖∞⌉) for any given integer m.
Input An integer m and a reduced basis [b1,b2] for L = 〈(N, 0), (−λψ , 1)〉.
Output A pair of integers (a, b) such that m ≡ a+ bλψ (mod N)
Step 1 Let α := mb22/N and β := −mb12/N .
8 Algorithm 1 differs from the standard technique (cf. [17, §4]), based on Babai
rounding [1], in Step 2. Instead of choosing c to be the shortest of the four vectors,
Babai rounding approximates it by selecting c′ = ⌊α⌉e1 + ⌊β⌉e2 (this is the correct
choice for most m). In terms of bitlength, this means an excess of one bit in the
worst case.
Step 2 Let c be the shortest of the four vectors ⌊α⌋b1 + ⌊β⌋b2, ⌊α⌋b1 + ⌈β⌉b2,
⌈α⌉b1 + ⌊β⌋b2, and ⌈α⌉b1 + ⌈β⌉b2.
Step 3 Return (a, b) := (m, 0)− c.
Proof. It is easily checked that (α, β) is the unique solution in Q2 to the linear
system αb1+βb2 = (m, 0) (here we use the fact that N = detL). Then c is the
closest vector to (m, 0) in L by Theorem 19 of [22], so ‖(a, b)‖∞ is minimal over
all decompositions of m. For the bound on ‖(a, b)‖∞, set c′ := ⌊α⌉b1 + ⌊β⌉b2;
then ‖(m, 0)−c‖∞ ≤ ‖(m, 0)−c′‖∞. The triangle inequality and |x−⌊x⌉| ≤ 1/2
for all x in Q imply ‖(m, 0)− c′‖∞ ≤ max(‖b1‖∞, ‖b2‖∞) = ‖b2‖∞. ⊓⊔
It remains to precompute a reduced basis for L. If |λψ| is not unusually
small, then there exists a reduced basis of size O(
√
N).9 Traditionally, we would
compute it using the Gauss reduction or Euclidean algorithms (cf. [22], [17, §4]
and [15, §17.1.1]), but in our case lattice reduction algorithms are unnecessary:
following the approach outlined in [43], we can immediately write down a reduced
basis for a large sublattice of L, which coincides with L when G = E(Fp2). If G
has a small cofactor in E(Fp2), then we can easily modify the sublattice basis to
give a proper reduced basis for L (as we will do in Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 below).
Lemma 1. The vectors e1 = (p+ ǫp,−r) and e2 = (−ǫpdr, p+ ǫp) generate a
sublattice L0 ⊆ L of index [L : L0] = #E(Fp2)/N . In particular, if #E(Fp2) = N ,
then L = L0. For large p,
– if ǫp = −1, then [e1, e2] is reduced;
– if ǫp = 1, then [e1 + e2, e1] (if r > 0) or [e1 − e2, e1] (if r < 0) is reduced.
In either case, the bitlength of the reduced basis is ⌈log2(p+ ǫp)⌉.
Proof. Corollary (2) implies rλψ ≡ p + ǫp and rǫpd ≡ (p + ǫp)λψ (mod N), so
e1 and e2 are in L; they are linearly independent, so they generate a sublattice.
The determinant is (p+ ǫp)
2 − ǫpdr2, which is #E(Fp2) by Eq. (11). Recall that
r is in O(
√
p) and d is very small, so ‖e1‖∞ = ‖e2‖∞ = p+ ǫp. The bases satisfy
Inequality (6), and hence are reduced. ⊓⊔
5 Endomorphisms from Quadratic Q-curves of Degree 2
Let ∆ be a squarefree integer. Hasegawa defines a one-parameter family
E˜2,∆,s : y2 = x3 + 2(C2,∆(s)− 24)x− 8(C2,∆(s)− 16)
of Q-curves of degree 2 over Q(
√
∆) in [20, Theorem 2.2], where
C2,∆(s) := 9(1 + s
√
∆)
9 General bounds on the constant hidden by the O(·) appear in [41], but they are far
from tight for inseparable endomorphisms. Lemma 1 gives much better results for
our endomorphisms in cryptographic contexts.
and s is a free parameter taking values in Q. Observe that σE˜2,∆,s = E˜2,∆,−s.
To realise the Q-curve structure, observe that E˜2,∆,s has a rational 2-torsion
point (4, 0). We compute the normalized quotient isogeny E˜2,∆,s → E˜2,∆,s/〈(4, 0)〉
using Eq. (2); but then we observe that E˜2,∆,s/〈(4, 0)〉 = (σE˜2,∆,s)
√−2, so com-
posing the quotient with the twisting isomorphism δ(1/
√−2) yields a 2-isogeny
φ˜2,∆,s : E˜2,∆,s −→ σE˜2,∆,s
defined by the rational map
φ˜2,∆,t : (x, y) 7−→
(−x
2
− C2,∆(s)
x− 4 ,
y√−2
(−1
2
+
C2,∆(s)
(x− 4)2
))
.
(The arbitrary choice of one of the two square roots of −2 results in an arbitrary
sign on φ˜2,∆,s.) Conjugating and composing again, we find that
σφ˜2,∆,s ◦ φ˜2,∆,s = [ǫ2]E˜2,∆,s where ǫ =
{
−1 if σ√−2 = √−2
+1 if σ
√−2 = −√−2 (12)
—and similarly, φ˜2,∆,s ◦ σφ˜2,∆,s = [ǫ2]σE˜2,∆,s .
The discriminant of the family E˜2,∆,s is 29 · C2,∆(s)2 · σC2,∆(s), and
j(E˜2,∆,s) = −12
3(C2,∆(s)− 24)3
C2,∆(s)2 · σC2,∆(s)
(letting s→∞,10 we find j(E˜2,∆,∞) = 1728). We see that E˜2,∆,s reduces modulo
any inert p > 3 to give a family of elliptic curves over Fp2 , and then every value
of s in Fp yields an elliptic curve over Fp2 . (Proposition 1 below shows that at
most two of these curves are isomorphic.)
Theorem 2. Let p > 3 be prime, fix a nonsquare ∆ modulo p, so Fp2 = Fp(
√
∆),
and let E2,∆,s and φ2,∆,s be the reductions modulo p of E˜2,∆,s and φ˜2,∆,s.
For each s in Fp, the curve E2,∆,s/Fp2 has an efficient Fp2-endomorphism
ψ2,∆,s := πp ◦ φ2,∆,s
of degree 2p such that ψ22,∆,s = [ǫp2]πE2,∆,s and (ψ
′
2,∆,s)
2 = [−ǫp2]πE′
2,∆,s
, where
ǫp := −
(−2/p) = {−1 if p ≡ 1, 3 (mod 8) ,
+1 if p ≡ 5, 7 (mod 8) .
10 “Letting s→∞” has a proper technical meaning here (and also in §6, §8, and §9)—
even over finite fields. The parameter s is defined by Hasegawa’s choice (following
Fricke) of a rational parametrization of the modular curveX0(2): that is, a birational
map between P1 and X0(2). Under this parametrization, the point at infinity on P
1
corresponds to the isomorphism class of the 2-isogeny (in fact, the endomorphism)
1+ ι, where ι is an automorphism of order 4 of the curve with j-invariant 1728; this
reflects what we find when we put s =∞ in the formula for j(E˜2,∆,s).
There exists an integer r satisfying 2r2 = 2p+ ǫptE2,∆,s such that
[r]ψ2,∆,s = [p] + ǫpπE2,∆,s and [r]ψ
′
2,∆,s = [p]− ǫpπE′2,∆,s ;
the characteristic polynomial of ψ2,∆,s and ψ
′
2,∆,s is P2,∆,s(T ) = T
2− 2rT +2p.
In particular, if E2,∆,s is ordinary and G ⊆ E2,∆,s(Fp2) is a cyclic subgroup
of order N such that ψ2,∆,s(G) ⊆ G, then the eigenvalue of ψ2,∆,s on G is
λ2,∆,s ≡ (p+ ǫp) /r ≡ ±
√
ǫp2 (mod N) .
Proof. Apply Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 to φ˜2,∆,s using Eq. (12). ⊓⊔
Proposition 1. If p > 7, then #
{
j(E2,∆,s) : s ∈ Fp
}
= p if −7 is a square
in Fp, and p− 1 otherwise.
Proof. Suppose j(E2,∆,s1) = j(E2,∆,s2), with s1 6= s2. Equating the j-invariants
symbolically, we must have F0(s1, s2) = 2
√
∆F1(s1, s2), where the polynomials
F0(T1, T2) = (∆T1T2 + 1)(81∆T1T2 − 175) + 49∆(T1 + T2)2 and F1(T1, T2) =
(T1 + T2)(63∆T1T2 − 65) have coefficients in Fp. If s1 and s2 are in Fp, then
F0(s1, s2) = F1(s1, s2) = 0; this happens if and only if s2 = −s1 and either
si
√
∆ = ±1 (which is impossible) or ± 59
√−7, whence the result. ⊓⊔
Both E2,∆,s(Fp2) and E ′2,∆,s(Fp2) contain points of order 2: they generate the
kernels of ψ2,∆,s and ψ
′
2,∆,s. If #E2,∆,s(Fp2) = 2kN and #E ′2,∆,s(Fp2) = 2k
′
N ′
with N and N ′ odd, then Eq. (1) modulo 8 implies that either k = k′ = 1, or
k = 2 and k′ ≥ 3, or k ≥ 3 and k′ = 2. Equation (11) modulo 3 implies that if
p ≡ 2 (mod 3) then either E2,∆,s(Fp2) or E ′2,∆,s(Fp2) contains a point of order 3.
Optimal decompositions. In view of the Pohlig–Hellman–Silver reduction [35]
and the rational 2-torsion point on E2,∆,s, the “optimal” situation for discrete-
log based cryptosystems is when E2,∆,s(Fp2) ∼= Z/2Z×G with #G prime (though
for faster arithmetic, we may want a cofactor of 4 instead of 2; we consider this
later). Lemma 2 constructs an optimal basis for the GLV lattice L in this case.
We can use this basis in Algorithm 1 to decompose scalar multiplications in G
as [m]P = [a]P ⊕ [b]ψ2,∆,s(P ) where a and b have at most ⌈log2 p⌉ bits.
Lemma 2. Suppose E2,∆,s(Fp2) ∼= Z/2Z × Z/NZ with N odd, and let L =
〈(N, 0), (−λ2,∆,s, 1)〉. Let e1 and e2 be defined as in Lemma 1. For large p,
– if ǫpr ≥ 0, then [−e2/2, e1 + e2/2] is a reduced basis for L;
– if ǫpr < 0, then [−e2/2, e1 − e2/2] is a reduced basis for L.
In either case, the bitlength of the reduced basis is ⌈log2(p+ ǫp − |r|)⌉.
Proof. Let L0 := 〈e1, e2〉 with e1 := (p + ǫp,−r) and e2 := (−ǫp2r, p + ǫp) as
in Lemma 1; then [L : L0] = 2, so exactly one of e1/2, e2/2, or (e1 + e2)/2 is
in L. Equation (11) shows that 2N = (p + ǫp)2 − 2ǫpr2 with |r| <
√
2p; since
N is odd, r must also be odd, so e2/2 is in Z
2 but e1/2 and (e1 + e2)/2 are
not—and hence they cannot be in L, either. We conclude that L = 〈e1, e2/2〉.
Inequality (6) is satisfied by b1 := −e2/2 and b2 := e1 ± e2/2 (with the sign
chosen according to whether ǫpr is positive or negative), so [b1,b2] is a reduced
basis for L. The longer of the vectors is b2, and ‖b2‖∞ = p+ ǫp − |r|. ⊓⊔
Example 1. Let p = 2127 − 1 and ∆ = −1. Taking s = 28106 in the family
E2,−1,s/Fp(
√
∆) yields a twist-secure curve at the 128-bit security level: we have
ǫp = 1 and tE2,−1,28106 = −272082382382015736940757543628153813996, so
#E2,−1,28106(Fp2) = p2 + 1− tE2,−1,28106 = 2 ·N and
#E ′2,−1,28106(Fp2) = p2 + 1 + tE2,−1,28106 = 2 ·N ′
where N and N ′ are 253-bit primes.11 Algorithm 1 and Lemma 2 transform 253-
bit scalar multiplications in E2,−1,28106(Fp2)[N ] into 128-bit multiexponentations.
This value of s is the “smallest” (counting upwards from 1) yielding a curve-twist
pair such that both curve orders are twice a prime. The curve coefficients, being
linear in s, are relatively small; but while small coefficients are important in
optimized implementations, here this is no more than a happy coincidence—we
did not explicitly search for an example with convenient coefficients.
Montgomery models. The curve E2,∆,s has a Montgomery model over Fp2 if and
only if 2C2,∆(s) is a square in Fp2 by [34, Proposition 1]—or equivalently, if
1 + s
√
∆ is a square in Fp2 (since 2 is always a square in Fp2). Setting
BM2,∆(s) := (2C2,∆(s))
1/2 and AM2,∆(s) := 12/B
M
2,∆(s) ,
the birational map (x, y) 7→ (X/Z, Y/Z) = ((x − 4)/BM2,∆(s), y/BM2,∆(s)2) takes
us from E2,∆,s to the projective Montgomery model
EM2,∆,s : BM2,∆(s)Y 2Z = X
(
X2 +AM2,∆(s)XZ + Z
2
)
(we may replace the term BM2,∆(s)Y
2Z in the defining equation with a conve-
niently small multiple of Y 2Z, if desired, by scaling the Y coordinate).
Montgomery models offer a particularly efficient arithmetic using only the X
and Z coordinates [32]. The induced endomorphism on the (X : Z)-line is
ψM2,∆,s : (X : Z) 7−→
(
X2p +AM2,∆(s)
p
XpZp + Z2p : −2AM2,∆(s)
p−1
XpZp
)
;
an implementation of fast scalar multiplication using ψM2,∆,s is detailed in [9].
Twisted Edwards models. Every Montgomery model corresponds to a twisted
Edwards model, and vice versa (cf. [3] and [21]). Indeed, E2,∆,s is isomorphic to
the twisted Edwards model
ETE2,∆,s :
(
12 + 2BM2,∆(s)
)
x21 + x
2
2 = 1 +
(
12− 2BM2,∆(s)
)
x21x
2
2
via (x, y) 7→ (x1, x2) =
(
(x− 4)/y, (x− 4−BM2,∆(s))/(x− 4 +BM2,∆(s))
)
. Com-
posing with ψ2,∆,s yields an endomorphism ψ
TE
2,∆,s of ETE2,∆,s.
11 We computed the traces for all of our examples using a new specialized variant
of the SEA algorithm [38] under development with Franc¸ois Morain and Charlotte
Scribot, implemented in NTL [39].
Optimal decompositions for cofactor 4. Every curve with a twisted Edwards
or Montgomery model has order divisible by 4; indeed, C2,∆(s) is a square in
Fp2 (so EM2,∆,s and ETE2,∆,s are defined over Fp2) if and only if E2,∆,s has full
rational 2-torsion. The optimal situation for discrete log-based cryptography
on these curves is therefore when E2,∆,s(Fp2) ∼= (Z/2Z)2 × G with #G prime.
Lemma 3 gives a reduced basis for the GLV lattice in this case, which we can
use in Algorithm 1 to decompose scalar multiplications in G as [m]P = [a]P ⊕
[b]ψ2,∆,s(P ) where a and b have at most ⌈log2 p⌉ − 1 bits.
Lemma 3. Suppose E2,∆,s(Fp2) ∼= (Z/2Z)2 × Z/NZ with N odd, and let L =
〈(N, 0), (−λ2,∆,s, 1)〉. Let e1 and e2 be defined as in Lemma 1. For large p,
– if ǫp = 1 and r ≥ 0, then [(e1 + e2)/2, e2/2] is a reduced basis for L;
– if ǫp = 1 and r < 0, then [(e1 − e2)/2,−e2/2] is a reduced basis for L;
– if ǫp = −1 and r ≥ 0, then [e1/2, e2/2] is a reduced basis for L;
– otherwise, if ǫp = −1 and r < 0, then [e1/2,−e2/2] is a reduced basis for L.
In each case, the bitlength of the reduced basis is ⌈log2(p+ ǫp)⌉ − 1.
Proof. The sublattice L0 = 〈e1, e2〉 has index 4 in L. Equation (11) implies
(p + ǫp)
2 ≡ 2ǫpr2 (mod 4), and since p + ǫp is even, r must be even as well; so
we can replace the relation ǫprλ2,∆,s ≡ p + ǫp with ǫp(r/2)λ2,∆,s ≡ (p + ǫp)/2
(mod N). Hence, both e1/2 and e2/2 are in L; so they must form a basis for L.
The listed bases are combinations of e1/2 and e2/2 satisfying Ineq. (6), and are
therefore reduced. The longest vector in each basis has length (p+ ǫp)/2. ⊓⊔
Doche–Icart–Kohel models. Doubling-oriented Doche–Icart–Kohel models are
defined by equations of the form y2 = x(x2 + Dx + 16D). These curves have
a rational 2-isogeny φ with kernel 〈(0, 0)〉, and both φ and its dual φ† are in
a special form that allows marginally faster doubling using the factorization
[2] = φ†φ (see [10, §3.1] for details). Our curves E2,∆,s come equipped with a
rational 2-isogeny, so it is natural to try putting them in Doche–Icart–Kohel
form. The same 2-isogeny plays two roˆles in this situation: as a factor of our
endomorphism for scalar decomposition, and as a factor of the doubling map
for Doche–Icart–Kohel arithmetic. We emphasize that these two applications
are distinct and complementary, and their benefits are cumulative. We have an
isomorphism from E2,∆,s to the Doche–Icart–Kohel model
EDIK2,∆,s : v2 = u
(
u2 + 1152C2,∆(s)u+ 16 · 1152C2,∆(s)
)
,
defined by (x, y) 7→ (u, v) = (α(x − 4), α3/2y) where α = 96/C2,∆(s); if C2,∆(s)
is not a square in Fp2 , then EDIK2,∆,s is Fp2 -isomorphic to E ′2,∆,s.
6 Endomorphisms from Quadratic Q-curves of Degree 3
Let ∆ be a squarefree integer. Hasegawa defines a one-parameter family
E˜3,∆,s : y2 = x3 − 3(2C3,∆(s) + 1)x+
(
C3,∆(s)
2 + 10C3,∆(s)− 2
)
of Q-curves of degree 3 over Q(
√
∆) in [20, Theorem 2.2], where
C3,∆(s) := 2(1 + s
√
∆)
and s is a free parameter taking values in Q. Observe that σE˜3,∆,s = E˜3,∆,−s.
To realize the degree-3 Q-curve structure, note that x− 3 defines an order-3
subgroup S = {0, (3,±σC3,∆(s))} of E˜3,∆,s(Q(
√
∆)). Computing the normalized
quotient isogeny E˜3,∆,s → E˜3,∆,s/S using Eqs. (3), (4), and (5), we observe that
E˜3,∆,s/S = (σE˜3,∆,s)
√−3; so composing the quotient with δ(1/
√−3) yields an
explicit 3-isogeny φ˜3,∆,s : E˜3,∆,s → σE˜3,∆,s defined by the rational map
φ˜3,∆,s : (x, y) 7−→
(
(φ˜3,∆,s)x(x),
y√−3
d(φ˜3,∆,s)x
dx
(x)
)
where
(φ˜3,∆,s)x(x) = −1
3
(
x+
12 · σC3,∆(s)
x− 3 +
4 · σC3,∆(s)2
(x− 3)2
)
.
Conjugating and composing again, we see that
σφ˜3,∆,s ◦ φ˜3,∆,s = ǫ[3]E˜3,∆,s where ǫ =
{
−1 if σ√−3 = √−3
+1 if σ
√−3 = −√−3 (13)
(and similarly, φ˜3,∆,s ◦ σφ˜3,∆,s = ǫ[3]σE˜3,∆,s).
This family has discriminant 24 · 33 · C3,∆(s) · σC3,∆(s)3 and j-invariant
j(E˜3,∆,s) = 2
8 · 33 · (2C3,∆(s) + 1)3
C3,∆(s) · σC3,∆(s)3
(letting s → ∞, we see that j(E˜3,∆,∞) = 0). Hence, E˜3,∆,s reduces modulo any
inert p > 3 to give a family of elliptic curves over Fp2 , and then every value of s
in Fp yields an elliptic curve over Fp2 . A calculation similar to Proposition 1
shows that we get at least p− 8 non-isomorphic curves in this way.
Theorem 3. Let p > 3 be prime, fix a nonsquare ∆ modulo p, so Fp2 = Fp(
√
∆),
and let E3,∆,s and φ3,∆,s be the reductions modulo p of E˜3,∆,s and φ˜3,∆,s.
For each s in Fp, the curve E3,∆,s/Fp2 has an efficient Fp2-endomorphism
ψ3,∆,s := πp ◦ φ3,∆,s
of degree 3p, such that ψ23,∆,s = [ǫp3]πE3,∆,s and (ψ
′
3,∆,s)
2 = [−ǫp3]πE′3,∆,s , where
ǫp := −
(−3/p) = {+1 if p ≡ 2 (mod 3) ,−1 if p ≡ 1 (mod 3) .
There exists an integer r satisfying 3r2 = 2p+ ǫptE3,∆,s such that
[r]ψ3,∆,s = [p] + ǫpπE3,∆,s and [r]ψ
′
3,∆,s = [p]− ǫpπE3,∆,s ;
the characteristic polynomial of ψ3,∆,s and ψ
′
3,∆,s is P3,∆,s(T ) = T
2− 3rT +3p.
In particular, if E3,∆,s is ordinary and G ⊆ E3,∆,s(Fp2) is a cyclic subgroup
of order N such that ψ3,∆,s(G) ⊆ G, then the eigenvalue of ψ3,∆,s on G is
λ3,∆,s ≡ (p+ ǫp)/r ≡ ±
√
ǫp3 (mod N) .
Proof. Follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 using Eq. (13). ⊓⊔
Optimal decompositions. The kernel of ψ3,∆,s is generated by the rational points
(3,±σC3,∆(s)), so #E3,∆,s(Fp2) is always divisible by 3. However, the nontrivial
points in the kernel of the twisted endomorphism ψ′3,∆,s are not defined over Fp2
(they are conjugates), so it is possible for E ′3,∆,s(Fp2) to have prime order.
From the point of view of the Pohlig–Hellman–Silver reduction, the “most
secure” curves in E3,∆,s/Fp2 have E3,∆,s(Fp2) ∼= Z/3Z × G, with G of prime
order. Lemma 4 gives an optimal basis for the GLV lattice L in this case (for a
prime-order twist, the basis of Lemma 1 is already optimal).
Lemma 4. Suppose E3,∆,s(Fp2) ∼= Z/3Z × Z/NZ with N prime to 3, and let
L = 〈(N, 0), (−λ3,∆,s, 1)〉. Let e1 and e2 be defined as in Lemma 1. For large p,
– if ǫpr ≥ 0, then [e2/3, e1 + 2e2/3] is a reduced basis of L;
– if ǫpr < 0, then [e2/3, e1 − 2e2/3] is a reduced basis of L.
In either case, the bitlength of the reduced basis is ⌈log2(p+ ǫp − 2|r|)⌉.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as for Lemma 2, with 3 in place of 2.
The sublattice 〈e1, e2〉 has index 3 in L, so exactly one of 13e1, 13e2, 13 (e1 + e2),
and 13 (e1− e2) is in L. Equation (11) gives 3N = (p+ ǫp)2− 3ǫpr2; but p ≡ −ǫp
(mod 3), so 13e2 is in Z
2. On the other hand, 3 ∤ r (since otherwise 3 | N),
so neither 13e1 nor
1
3 (e1 ± e2) is in Z2. Hence 〈e1, 13e2〉 is the only lattice in
Z2 containing 〈e1, e2〉 with index 3, so L = 〈e1, 13e2〉. The vectors 13e2 and
e1 ± 2e2/3 satisfy Ineq. (6), so they form a reduced basis for L; the longest of
their components is p+ ǫp − 2|r|. ⊓⊔
Example 2. Let p = 2127 − 1; then ∆ = −1 is a nonsquare in Fp. The param-
eter value s = 10400 yields a twist-secure curve at the 128-bit security level:
#E3,−1,10400(Fp2) = 3 ·N and #E ′3,−1,10400(Fp2) = N ′, where N and N ′ are 253-
and 254-bit primes, respectively. As in Example 1, this is the smallest value of s
yielding a curve-twist pair with orders in this form. Any scalar multiplication in
E3,−1,10400(Fp2)[N ] or E ′3,−1,10400(Fp2)[N ′] can be computed via a 127-bit mul-
tiexponentiation using Algorithm 1 with the basis of Lemma 4. (We warn the
reader that here, one of the curve coefficients is quadratic in s; so small values of s
may not yield particularly convenient coefficients for serious implementations.)
Doche–Icart–Kohel models. We can exploit the 3-isogeny on E3,∆,s for faster
tripling (cf. [10, §3.2]): E3,∆,s is isomorphic to the tripling-oriented Doche–Icart-
Kohel model
EDIK3,∆,s : v2 = u3 + 3 ·
9
C3,∆(s)
p (u + 1)
2
via (x, y) 7→ (u, v) = (α(x − 3), α3/2y) where α := 3C3,∆(s)−p. This is an Fp2-
isomorphism if C3,∆(s) is a square in Fp2 ; otherwise, EDIK3,∆,s ∼=Fp2 E ′3,∆,s.
7 Endomorphisms from Quadratic Q-curves of Degree 5
For d = 5, Hasegawa notes that it is impossible to give a universal Q-curve
for arbitrary squarefree ∆: there exists a quadratic Q-curve of degree 5 over
Q(
√
∆) if and only if
(
5
/
pi
)
= 1 for every prime pi 6= 5 dividing ∆ (see [20,
Proposition 2.3]). This restricts our choice of ∆ for a given p.
The special case∆ = −1 is particularly interesting: by the above, there exists
a family of Q-curves of degree 5 over Q(
√−1), and every prime p ≡ 3 (mod 4) is
inert in Q(
√−1). We work this case out in detail below. The remaining case p ≡ 1
(mod 4) is a straightforward exercise: given a fixed prime p > 5, we choose a
squarefree∆meeting the condition above, then apply [20, Theorem 2.4] to derive
a family of degree-5 Q-curves over Q(
√
∆) amenable to the construction of §3.12
Of course, compared with d = 2 and 3, endomorphisms with separable degree
d = 5 are intrinsically slower. The chief interest of this family is that unlike with
d = 2 and 3, here neither the generic curve nor its twist have rational torsion
points, so it is possible for reductions and their twists to both have prime order.
Let E˜5,−1,s be the family of elliptic curves over Q(
√−1) defined by
E˜5,−1,s : y2 = x3 +A5,−1(s)x+B5,−1(s)
where
A5,−1(s) := −27s(11s− 2)
(
3(6s2 + 6s− 1)− 20s(s− 1)√−1) ,
B5,−1(s) := 54s2(11s− 2)2
(
(13s2 + 59s− 9)− 2(s− 1)(20s+ 9)√−1) ,
and s is a free parameter taking values in Q.
The family E˜5,−1,s is a family of Q-curves of degree 5: the polynomial
(1 + 2
√−1)(x − 3s(11s− 2)(2−√−1))2 + 81s(11s− 2)(1 + s√−1)2
defines the kernel S of a 5-isogeny φ˜5,−1,s : E˜5,−1,s → σE˜5,−1,s over Q(
√−1),
which is the composition of the normalized quotient E˜5,−1,s → E˜5,−1,s/S (as in
Eqs. (3), (4), and (5)) with the twisting isomorphism δ(5/(1 + 2
√−1)). Conju-
gating and composing again, we find
σφ˜5,∆,s ◦ φ˜5,∆,s = [5]E5,∆,s and φ˜5,∆,s ◦ σφ˜5,∆,s = [5]σE5,∆,s . (14)
The family has discriminant −26312s3(11s− 2)3(1 + s2)(1 + s√−1)4, and
j(E˜5,−1,s) =
−64 (3(6s2 + 6s− 1)− 20(s2 − s)√−1)3
(1 + s2)(1 + s
√−1)4 .
Hence, E˜5,−1,s is an elliptic curve for all s in Q\{0, 2/11}, and these E˜5,−1,s have
good reduction at any p > 5 inert in Q(
√−1). The analogue of Proposition 1
shows that we get at least p− 25 non-isomorphic curves in this way.
12 In [44], the author suggested that for any p ≡ 1 (mod 4) one could use∆ = −11 with
Hasegawa’s parameters in [20, Table 6] in the construction of §3. This is incorrect:
by Dirichlet’s theorem, half of the p ≡ 1 (mod 4) are not inert in Q(√−11).
Theorem 4. Let p be a prime congruent to 3 modulo 4, so Fp2 = Fp(
√−1),
and let E5,−1,s and φ5,−1,s be the reductions mod p of E˜5,−1,s and φ˜5,−1,s.
For each s 6= 0 or 2/11 in Fp, the curve E5,−1,s/Fp2 has an efficient Fp2-
endomorphism
ψ5,−1,s := πp ◦ φ5,−1,s
of degree 5p such that ψ25,−1,s = [5]πE5,−1,s and (ψ
′
5,−1,s)
2 = [−5]πE′5,−1,s . There
exists an integer r satisfying 5r2 = 2p+ tE5,−1,s such that
[r]ψ5,−1,s = [p] + πE5,−1,s and [r]ψ
′
5,−1,s = [p]− πE5,−1,s ;
the characteristic polynomial of ψ5,−1,s and ψ′5,−1,s is P5,−1,s(T ) = T
2−5rT+5p.
In particular, if E5,−1,s is ordinary and G ⊆ E5,−1,s(Fp2) is a cyclic subgroup
of order N such that ψ5,−1,s(G) ⊆ G, then the eigenvalue of ψ5,−1,s on G is
λ5,−1,s ≡ (p+ 1)/r ≡ ±
√
5 (mod N) .
Proof. Follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 using Eq. (14). ⊓⊔
Reductions of curves in E˜5,−1,s may have prime order, and so can their twists.
In this situation, Algorithm 1 with the basis of Lemma 1 computes optimal scalar
decompositions for ψ5,−1,s (of bitlength at most ⌈log2(p+ 1)⌉).
Example 3. Let p = 2127−1 and∆ = −1. Taking s = 7930 in the degree-5 family
yields a twist-secure curve at the 128-bit security level: the trace of E5,−1,7930 is
tE2,−1,28106 = 160084314926568661653252069280514036151 ,
so #E5,−1,7930(Fp2) and #E ′5,−1,7930(Fp2) are both 254-bit primes. We transform
254-bit scalar multiplications in E5,−1,7930(Fp2) into a 127-bit multiexponentia-
tions using Algorithm 1 with the basis of Lemma 1. As in Examples 1 and 2, this
is the smallest value of s yielding a curve-twist pair with both curves of prime
order. (Here the curve coefficients are quartic and sextic in s, so the smallness
of s has little effect on the convenience of the coefficients for implementations—
however, as we remarked above, this family is essentially of theoretical interest.)
8 Endomorphisms from Quadratic Q-curves of Degree 7
For completeness, we include a family of Q-curves of degree 7. These curves are
less interesting for practical applications, since the higher degree renders the
endomorphism intrinsically slower than the curves with d = 2, 3, and 5.
Let ∆ be a squarefree integer. Hasegawa defines a one-parameter family
E˜7,∆,s : y2 = x3 +A7,∆(s)x+B7,∆(s)
of Q-curves of degree 7 over Q(
√
∆) in [20, Theorem 2.2], where
A7,∆(s) = −3C7,∆(s)(85 + 96s
√
∆+ 15s2∆) ,
B7,∆(s) = 14C7,∆(s)
(
9(3s4∆2 + 130s2∆+ 171) + 16(9s2∆+ 163)s
√
∆
)
,
C7,∆(s) = 7(27 + s
2∆) ,
and s is a free parameter taking values in Q. Observe that σE˜7,∆,s = E˜7,∆,−s.
The family E˜7,∆,s is a family of quadratic Q-curves of degree 7. More explic-
itly: E˜7,∆,s has a subgroup S of order 7 defined by the kernel polynomial
(x−C7,∆(s))3−42(1−s
√
∆)2C7,∆(s)
[
3(x−C7,∆(s))+4(1−s
√
∆)(27+s
√
∆)
]
.
While S is defined over Q(√∆), none of its nontrivial points are. Computing
the normalized quotient E˜7,∆,s → E˜7,∆,s/S (using Eqs. (3), (4), and (5)) and
composing with the twisting isomorphism δ(1/
√−7) yields an explicit 7-isogeny
φ˜7,∆,s : E˜7,∆,s → E˜7,∆,s. Conjugating and composing again, we see that
σφ˜7,∆,s ◦ φ˜7,∆,s = [ǫ7]E7,∆,s where ǫ =
{
−1 if σ√−7 = √−7
+1 if σ
√−7 = −√−7 (15)
(and similarly, φ˜7,∆,s ◦ σφ˜7,∆,s = [ǫ7]σE7,∆,s).
The discriminant of E˜7,∆,s is 212 · 36 · 7 · C7,∆(s)2(1− s2∆)(1 − s
√
∆)6, and
j
(E˜7,∆,s) = (27 + s2∆)(85 + 96s√∆+ 15s2∆)3
(1− s2∆)(1 − s√∆)6
(letting s→∞, we find j(E˜7,∆,∞) = −3375); so E˜7,∆,s reduces modulo any inert
p > 7 to give a family of elliptic curves E7,∆,s/Fp2 , and then any value of s in
Fp such that s
2 6= −27/∆ yields an elliptic curve over Fp2 . A calculation similar
to Proposition 1 shows that we get at least p− 48 non-isomorphic curves in this
way, when p is sufficiently large.
Theorem 5. Let p > 7 be prime, fix a nonsquare ∆ modulo p, so Fp2 = Fp(
√
∆),
and let E7,∆,s and φ7,∆,s be the reductions modulo p of E˜7,∆,s and φ˜7,∆,s.
For each s in Fp such that s
2 6= −27/∆, the curve E7,∆,s/Fp2 has an efficient
Fp2-endomorphism ψ7,∆,s := πp ◦ φ7,∆,s of degree 7p satisfying
ψ27,∆,s = [ǫp7]πE7,∆,s and (ψ
′
3,∆,s)
2 = [−ǫp7]πE′7,∆,s
where
ǫp := −
(−7/p) = {+1 if p ≡ 3, 5, 6 (mod 7) ,−1 if p ≡ 1, 2, 4 (mod 7) .
There exists an integer r satisfying 7r2 = 2p+ ǫptE7,∆,s such that
[r]ψ7,∆,s = [p] + ǫpπE7,∆,s and [r]ψ
′
7,∆,s = [p]− ǫpπE7,∆,s ;
the characteristic polynomial of ψ7,∆,s and ψ
′
7,∆,s is P7,∆,s(T ) = T
2− 7rT +7p.
In particular, if E7,∆,s is ordinary and G ⊆ E7,∆,s(Fp2) is a cyclic subgroup
of order N such that ψ7,∆,s(G) ⊆ G, then the eigenvalue of ψ7,∆,s on G is
λ7,∆,s ≡ (p+ ǫp) /r ≡ ±
√
ǫp7 (mod N) .
Proof. Follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 using Eq. (15). ⊓⊔
9 Exceptional CM and 4-dimensional Decompositions
By definition, Q-curves do not have CM. However, if E˜s is a family of Q-curves
then some isolated curves in E˜s may have CM. These exceptional curves are of
interest for 4-dimensional scalar decompositions: they form a natural generaliza-
tion of the GLV+GLS curves described by Longa and Sica [29].
Briefly: if E˜/Q(√∆) has CM by an order of small discriminant, then we can
compute an explicit endomorphism ρ˜ of E˜ of small degree (using Stark’s algo-
rithm [46], say), which then yields an efficient endomorphism ρ on the reduction
E of E˜ modulo p, exactly as in the GLV construction. If E˜ is d-isogenous to σE˜
and p is inert in Q(
√
∆), then E also has the degree-dp endomorphism ψ con-
structed in §3. The endomorphisms [1], ρ, ψ, and ρψ may then be used as a basis
for the 4-dimensional decomposition techniques elaborated in [29].
Practical limitations of 4-dimensional decompositions. “Q-curves with CM” in-
herit the chief drawback of the GLV construction: as noted in §1, we cannot
hope to find secure (and twist-secure) curves when p is fixed. This scarcity of
secure curves is easily explained: reductions of CM endomorphisms (including
GLV endomorphisms) are separable, and efficient separable endomorphisms have
extremely small degree, so that their (dense) defining polynomials can be eval-
uated quickly.13 But the degree of an endomorphism is the norm of the corre-
sponding CM-order element; and to have non-integers of very small norm, the
CM-order must have a tiny discriminant. Up to twists, the number of elliptic
curves with CM discriminant −D is the class number h(−D) (which is asymptot-
ically in O(
√
D)). The six orders containing endomorphisms of degree ≤ 3 have
class number 1, and hence only one corresponding j-invariant. For −D = −4,
corresponding to j = 1728, there are two or four Fp2 -isomorphism classes; for
−D = −3, corresponding to j = 0, we have two or six; and otherwise we have
only two. In particular, there are at most 18 pairwise non-isomorphic curves
over Fp2 with a nontrivial endomorphism of degree at most 3.
Over a fixed finite field, the probability that any of these curves will have a
secure group order, let alone be twist-secure, is very low: roughly speaking, we
expect to try O(log2 p) random curves over Fp2 before finding a twist-secure one
(see [40], for example, for more accurate heuristics). In practice, then, we cannot
use these curves when p is fixed for efficiency. Higher-dimensional scalar decom-
position speedups therefore come at the cost of suboptimal field arithmetic: we
pay for shorter loop lengths with comparatively slower field (and hence group)
operations, to say nothing of a more complicated multiexponentiation algorithm.
We must therefore choose between 4-dimensional decompositions and faster
underlying field arithmetic. Here we have chosen the latter, so we do not treat
CM curves in depth. However, we enumerate the exceptional CM curves in our
families in Theorem 6, to provide a convenient source of curves for readers in-
terested in exploring and implementing 4-dimensional techniques.
13 By dense, we mean that these polynomials have many nonzero terms; the cost of
their evaluation therefore depends linearly on the degree.
Exceptional CM curves. Any one-dimensional family ofQ-curves has only finitely
many exceptional CM curves, up to isomorphism, and it is easy to compute them.
Theorem 6. The exceptional CM curves in the families E˜2,∆,s, E˜3,∆,s, E˜5,−1,s,
and E˜7,∆,s are as follows. (In each table, if s
√
∆ takes the given value then E˜d,∆,s
has CM by the order of discriminant −D0f2, where −D0 is the fundamental
discriminant and f is the conductor.)
1. The following table lists the CM fibres in E˜2,∆,s (completing Quer’s list [36,
§5], where s
√
∆ = 0, ± 59
√−7, and ∞ are missing).
s
√
∆ −D0f2 s
√
∆ −D0f2 s
√
∆ −D0f2 s
√
∆ −D0f2
∞ −4 · 12 ± 59
√−7 −7 · 12 ± 12
√
5 −20 · 12 ± 518
√
13 −52 · 12
± 712
√
3 −4 · 32 0 −8 · 12 ± 23
√
2 −24 · 12 ± 7099
√
2 −88 · 12
± 161360
√
5 −4 · 52 ± 2049
√
6 −8 · 32 ± 49
√
5 −40 · 12 ± 145882
√
37 −148 · 12
± 18209801
√
29 −232 · 12
2. The following table lists the CM fibres in E˜3,∆,s (completing Quer’s list [37,
§6], where s
√
∆ = 0, ± 14
√−11, ± 52
√−2, and ∞ are missing).
s
√
∆ −D0f2 s
√
∆ −D0f2 s
√
∆ −D0f2
∞ −3 · 12 ± 52
√−2 −8 · 12 ± 12
√
2 −24 · 12
0 −3 · 22 ± 14
√−11 −11 · 12 ± 14
√
17 −51 · 12
± 59
√
3 −3 · 42 ±√5 −15 · 12 ± 532
√
41 −123 · 12
± 920
√
5 −3 · 52 ± 1125
√
5 −15 · 22 ± 53500
√
89 −267 · 12
± 55252
√
21 −3 · 72
3. The only CM fibres in E˜5,−1,s are E˜5,−1,1 (defined over Q) and E˜5,−1,−9/13;
both have j-invariant 663 and CM by the order of discriminant −4 · 22.
4. The following table lists the CM fibres in E˜7,∆,s.
s
√
∆ −D0f2 s
√
∆ −D0f2
∞ −7 · 12 ±√5 −35 · 12
0 −7 · 22 ± 13
√
13 −91 · 12
± 13
√
7 −7 · 42 ± 539
√
61 −427 · 12
Proof. Suppose E˜/Q(√∆) is isogenous to σE˜ . If E˜ has CM by the order of dis-
criminant −D0f2, then so does σE˜ ; hence, both j(E˜) and σj(E˜) = j(σE˜) are
roots of the Hilbert class polynomial H−D0f2 . But H−D0f2 is irreducible over Q,
so either H−D0f2(T ) = T − j(E˜) with j(E˜) = j(σE˜) in Q, or H−D0f2(T ) =
(T − j(E˜))(T − j(σE˜)). Tables 1 and 2 list every quadratic imaginary discrimi-
nant −D0f2 such that degH−D0f2 (which is the class number h(−D0f2)) is 1
or 2, along with the associated j-invariants: these can be found in the Echidna
database [25], or (re)computed using Magma ([6], [30]) or Sage [45]. To find
the exceptional CM curves in each of our families, we solve for rational s and
squarefree ∆ such that the j-invariant of the family appears in Table 1 or 2.
Theorem 6 gives a simple alternative construction for some of the curves
investigated by Guillevic and Ionica in [19]: the curves E1,c and E2,c of [19, §2]
are E
√
3
2,∆,s with c = s
√
∆ and E3,∆,s with c = −2s
√
∆, respectively. The 255-bit
curve of [19, Ex. 1] is a twist of E2,5,4/9 by
√
3. This curve is not twist-secure.
Table 1. The thirteen quadratic imaginary discriminants −D0f2 of class number 1,
together with the j-invariants of the elliptic curves over Q with CM by the quadratic
order of each discriminant.
−D0f2 j-invariant −D0f2 j-invariant −D0f2 j-invariant −D0f2 j-invariant
−3 · 12 0 −4 · 12 123 −8 · 12 203 −43 · 12 −9603
−3 · 22 2 · 303 −4 · 22 663 −11 · 12 −215 −67 · 12 −52803
−3 · 32 −3 · 203 −7 · 12 −153 −19 · 12 −963 −163 · 12 −6403203
−7 · 22 2553
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